Federalist papers 10
I appeal to the objectors themselves, whether they would in that case have employed the same reasoning in justification of Congress as they now make use of against the convention.The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great weight to this reasoning.If, on the contrary, he happened to be a man of calm and dispassionate feelings, he would indulge a sigh for the frailty of human nature, and would lament, that in a matter so interesting to the happiness of millions, the true merits of the question should be perplexed and entangled by expedients so unfriendly to an impartial and right determination.Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates.This simple view of the matter suggests several important consequences.A rigorous adherence, however, to this principle, is waived by those who would be gainers by it.But neither the common nor the statute law of that, or of any other nation, ought to be a standard for the proceedings of this, unless previously made its own by legislative adoption.
And we may conclude with the fullest assurance that the people, through that channel, will be better informed of the conduct of their national representatives, than they can be by any means they now possess of that of their State representatives.The mass would be likely to remain nearly the same, assimilating constantly to itself its gradual accretions.The governor CLAIMS, and has frequently EXERCISED, the right of nomination, and is ENTITLED to a casting vote in the appointment.No senator, representative, or other person holding a place of trust or profit under the United States, can be of the numbers of the electors.Those matters which in negotiations usually require the most secrecy and the most despatch, are those preparatory and auxiliary measures which are not otherwise important in a national view, than as they tend to facilitate the attainment of the objects of the negotiation.As to the suggestion of double taxation, the answer is plain.Whatever hopes or projects might be entertained by a few aspiring characters, it must generally happen that a great proportion of the men deriving their advancement from their influence with the people, would have more to hope from a preservation of the favor, than from innovations in the government subversive of the authority of the people.We have seen that the tendency of republican governments is to an aggrandizement of the legislative at the expense of the other departments.
Federalist Papers – Chapters 1 & 10As a nursery of seamen, it now is, or when time shall have more nearly assimilated the principles of navigation in the several States, will become, a universal resource.The executive magistrate has a qualified negative on the legislative body, and the Senate, which is a part of the legislature, is a court of impeachment for members both of the executive and judiciary departments.Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear.The injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws, will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones.If the interposition of the general government should not be needed, the provision for such an event will be a harmless superfluity only in the Constitution.
The organization of Congress is itself utterly improper for the exercise of those powers which are necessary to be deposited in the Union.The money saved from one object may be usefully applied to another, and there will be so much the less to be drawn from the pockets of the people.
Suppose, for instance, we were engaged in a war, in conjunction with one foreign nation, against another.Next to the effectual establishment of the Union, the best possible precaution against danger from standing armies is a limitation of the term for which revenue may be appropriated to their support.How shall we prevent a conflict between charity and judgment.If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the people should in future become more partial to the federal than to the State governments, the change can only result from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration, as will overcome all their antecedent propensities.
Hence, in every exercise of the power of appointing to offices, by an assembly of men, we must expect to see a full display of all the private and party likings and dislikes, partialities and antipathies, attachments and animosities, which are felt by those who compose the assembly.And of consequence, all the declamation about the disinclination to a change vanishes in air.The members of the diet, as such, are subject in all cases to be judged by the emperor and diet, and in their private capacities by the aulic council and imperial chamber.Madison believed that the problem was not with the Articles, but rather the state legislatures, and so the solution was not to fix the articles but to restrain the excesses of the states.
Essays from BookRags provide great ideas for Federalist No. 10 essays and paper topics like Essay.In 1726, the treaty of Hanover was delayed by these means a whole year.The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.The spirit of enterprise, which characterizes the commercial part of America, has left no occasion of displaying itself unimproved.
The entire legislature can perform no judiciary act, though by the joint act of two of its branches the judges may be removed from their offices, and though one of its branches is possessed of the judicial power in the last resort.The Duration in Office of the Executive From the New York Packet Tuesday, March 18, 1788.So far as the disposition of each towards the other may be influenced by these causes, the State governments must clearly have the advantage.For the same reason that the limited powers of the Congress, and the control of the State legislatures, justify less frequent elections than the public safely might otherwise require, the members of the Congress need be less numerous than if they possessed the whole power of legislation, and were under no other than the ordinary restraints of other legislative bodies.
Experience will forever admonish them that, on the contrary, AFTER SECURING A SUFFICIENT NUMBER FOR THE PURPOSES OF SAFETY, OF LOCAL INFORMATION, AND OF DIFFUSIVE SYMPATHY WITH THE WHOLE SOCIETY, they will counteract their own views by every addition to their representatives.But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property.In a few of them, however, commerce nearly divides its empire, and in most of them has a considerable share of influence.Upon a comparison of the plan for the appointment of the officers of the proposed government with that which is established by the constitution of this State, a decided preference must be given to the former.To the second question it may be answered, that if the general government should interpose by virtue of this constitutional authority, it will be, of course, bound to pursue the authority.To this reasoning it may perhaps be objected, that if any State should be disaffected to the authority of the Union, it could at any time obstruct the execution of its laws, and bring the matter to the same issue of force, with the necessity of which the opposite scheme is reproached.In either case, feebleness and irresolution must be the characteristics of the station.The alarming indifference discoverable in the exercise of so invaluable a privilege under the existing laws, which afford every facility to it, furnishes a ready answer to this question.
It may be asked, Why, then, could not a time have been fixed in the Constitution.The principle of this objection would condemn a practice, which is to be seen in all the State governments, if not in all the governments with which we are acquainted: I mean that of rendering those who hold offices during pleasure, dependent on the pleasure of those who appoint them.